"'It is a principle of general application in Anglo-American jurisprudence that one is not bound by a judgment in personam in a litigation in which he is not designated as a party or to which he has not been made a party by service of process.'" Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 884 (2008), quoting Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 40 (1940). Likewise, strangers to a judgment do not generally have the standing to enforce the same. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 750 (1975). These principles also find their expression in the requirement under the res judicata doctrines of claim and issue preclusion that there be identity of the parties in order for a claim to be barred or an issue closed for consideration by prior litigation. See, e.g., Heacock v. Heacock, 402 Mass. 21, 23-24, 25 (1988). These principles also reflect substantive and procedural Due Process concerns. People should have their days in court, and not be bound by others' days in court. It is for this reason also that default judgments, Treglia v. MacDonald, 430 Mass. 237, 242 (1999), and consent decrees, New York Cent. & H.R.R. Co. v. T. Stuart & Sons, Co., 260 Mass. 242, 248-249 (1927), have no preclusive effect in subsequent litigation.
On October 8, 2014, the Massachusetts Appeals Court handed down its decision in Great Woods, Inc. v. Clemmey, Docket No. 13-P-1817, through a Memorandum and Order Pursuant to Rule 1:28. In that unpublished decision, the Appeals Court panel (Kantrowitz, Grainger & Hanlon, JJ.) vacated the Order of the Middlesex Superior Court, Tuttman, J., (1) clarifying that a 1996 permanent injunction remained in full force and effect, notwithstanding the fact that its beneficiary, Plaintiff, Great Woods, Inc., no longer exists; and (2) denying relief to Clemmey under Mass. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(5).